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CASE NO. 14281 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FRED P. ADAMS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FIRST STATE BANK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
......,''....,,.. --00O00 * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
00O00 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for the return of a boat, and personal 
property wrongfully taken and for damages for the wrongful 
taking and detention of the boat and personal property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion for partial 
Summary judgment. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent disagrees with the statement of facts 
contained in the Appellant's Brief in practically every 
aspect and therefore sets forth it's own statement of facts. 
Fred p. Adams died unexpectedly on August 19, 1975, 
(the same date as the minute entry of the lower court grant-
ing Summary judgment to plaintiff.) It has been agreed 
that the widow of the deceased, as Executrix of the Estate 
of Fred p. Adams, deceased, may be substituted as the party 
plaintiff for the remainder of the proceedings in this case. 
All references in this Brief, as to plaintiff, however, will 
be made to Fred p. Adams. 
Fred p. Adams, hereinafter referred to as Adams, was 
the sole owner and operator of a business known as Fasco which 
sold special equipment for spraying fiber glass gel coats 
and sold fiber glass reinforcement, gel coats, resins and 
special equipment for the fiber glass industry. Deseret 
United, inc., hereinafter referred to as United, was a dis-
tributor or manufacturer's representative which was engaged 
in the business of selling boats generally on a wholesale 
basis to retain boat dealers. United, for the most part, 
sold boats manufactured by the defendant, Deseret Manufactur-
ing, corporation, hereinafter referred to as Deseret Manu-
facturing. 
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Lynn Nuffer and Steven Tapp were both officers and/or 
directors and employees of the defendant Deseret Manufactur-
ing. Deseret Manufacturing was primarily a boat manufactur-
ing company which manufactured and sold various types of 
fiber glass boats with the motors, power drives and associated 
equipment installed. 
Deseret Manufacturing had, for some time, been purchasing 
fiber glass materials, etc., from Fasco. On a number of 
occasions, Deseret Manufacturing paid for the materials with 
cash and on other occasions, they paid for the materials 
with a check. (Adams Deposition Pg. 6) A group of checks 
given by Deseret Manufacturing to Adams were dishonored 
by the bank all at once. (Adams Deposition pgs. 6-7) 
After demand had been made upon Deseret Manufacturing 
by Adams to pay the checks, it was immediately agreed that 
the total sum of the checks which had not been paid by the 
bank would be allowed as a cash down payment on a boat to 
be purchased by Adams from Deseret Manufacturing. 
"A The second set of checks I do not have in my 
possession. I turned them over to them as a cash 
payment on the boat in question. 
Q Well, you turned them over—you turned those checks 
over to them as—in exchange for a boat, is that 
right? 
A in exchange for a down payment on a boat, yes. 
Q When did you do that? 
A On June the 6th." (Adams Deposition Pg. 7) 
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At the time of the agreement of the exchange of the 
checks for the down payment on a boat, Steven Tapp prepared 
a "Dealer Order Form11 and signed it, showing that a boat, 
model SF 22 00 was to be manufactured and delivered to Adams 
as soon as possible and that of the total purchase price 
due, the sum of $3,568.27, was to be allowed as the down 
payment on the boat, which boat was to have been sold at 
dealer's net price. (Tapp Deposition Pgs. 6-7) A copy of 
the Dealer's Order Form is attached to the deposition of 
Steven Tapp and marked as Exhibit D-l. 
It was further determined that at the time of the 
purchase of the boat, whatever the price of the boat was, 
that when the boat was delivered, Adams would either pay 
the balance in cash or trade materials. The discussion and 
agreement took place at Deseret Manufacturing in Manti, 
Utah. (Adams Deposition Pg. 9) 
No further demands were made upon Deseret Manufacturing 
by Adams for payment of the checks inasmuch as it was determin-
ed by Adams that they had, in fact, become a cash payment on 
the boat to be manufactured for Adams as soon as possible. 
(Adams Deposition pg. 10) 
The boat was either being manufactured at the time of 
the agreement, marked as Exhibit "P-l", or thereafter Deseret 
Manufacturing started the construction of the boat to be sold 
to Adams. 
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On August 2nd, 1974, (two months later) Nuffer and 
Tapp went to the First State Bank to borrow the sum of 
$5,900.00 for Deseret Manufacturing, which sum they re-
presented was the amount necessary to pick up some in-
board motors which had been shipped to them for installa-
tion in boats they were manufacturing. (Kunz Deposition 
Pg. 4) Vernon Kunz, hereinafter referred to as Kunz, an 
officer of the First State Bank, entered into an Agreement 
whereby the bank would loan the sum of $5,900.00 to Deseret 
Manufacturing and in return take a Financing Statement and 
Security Agreement on the motors to be picked up and also on 
several boats being manufactured. (Kunz Deposition Pgs. 4-5) 
The value of the motors alone was in the sum of approximately 
$5,900.00. The First State B^nk filed the Financing Statement 
with the Secretary of State for the State of Utah on August 5, 
1975, (R.102). The Financing Statement and the Security Agree-
ment contained the Serial Numbers of the motors and the Serial 
Numbers of several boats being manufactured. (R.102) 
The First State Bank or Deseret Manufacturing or both, 
either made a mistake in the serial number on the Security 
Agreement relating to the boat being manufactured for Adams or 
at no time did the First State Bank intend to take as Security 
the said boat, but it is without dispute that the Financing 
Statement filed by the First State Bank does not contain the 
serial number of the Adams boat. 
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The defendant alleges that the serial number of the 
motor in the Adams boat was listed on the Financing State-
ment; but admits that it is shown as being installed in 
another boat with a different serial number. in other words, 
the numbers on the motors and the boats did not correspond 
on the Financing Statement and in no instance did the 
Financing Statement or the Security Agreement reflect the 
serial number of the Adams boat. (Kunz Deposition pg. 10, 
lines 7-10) 
The Financing Statement and Security Agreement, copies 
of which are attached to the deposition of Lynn Nuffer and 
marked as Exhibit "D-l and D-3" show that the serial numbers 
on the boats differ by only one digit and the remaining portion 
of serial numbers are identical. The serial numbers on the 
motors differ by only one digit and the full number is miss-
ing from one motor designation. 
An examination of the Financing Statement filed by the 
bank shows the following descriptions: 
#DMFA0085M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 2 55 Waukesha Motot # WLDVSLI6-11821 
#DMFA0082M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 255 Waukesha Motor # WLDVSLI6-11824 
#DMFA0080M75l, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 255 Waukesha Motor # WLDVSLI6 
Subsequent to the date that the First State Bank filed the 
Financing Statement, Nuffer and Tapp, brought the boat being 
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manufactured for Adams to Salt Lake City, Adams became 
aware the boat was in salt Lake City and examined it and 
was advised by Nuffer and Tapp that Adams could not have 
his boat; but instead, Deseret Manufacturing needed to sell 
the boat to someone else to obtain additional cash. (Adams 
Deposition pgs. 21, 22 & 23) 
After a considerable amount of heated discussion had 
taken place, it was finally suggested that Adams could have 
"his" boat if he would agree to advance additional cash to 
Deseret Manufacturing. Adams was to pay to Deseret Manufactur-
ing an additional $2,100.00 on the date of the delivery of 
the boat. in addition, Adams was to obtain loans from his 
bank and advance approximately $6,500.00, in additional cash, 
to Deseret Manufacturing so that Deseret Manufacturing could 
pay off additional debts and obligations (Adams Deposition 
Pg. 31) while they were attempting to sell boats through their 
distributor, United, for cash. (Adams Deposition pg. 20) 
United was to guarantee re-payment of the additional loaned 
funds to Adams. 
Adams testified as follows: 
"Q Well, why were you becoming involved in this 
financially? 
A Because they wouldn't let me have my boat unless 
• . . I . . . 
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agreed to finance another boat for them to get them 
over their tough period." Adams Deposition Pg. 15 
lines 12-15. 
On the 14th day of August, 1974, Nuffer brought the 
Adams boat to the parking lot at the Cottonwood Mall near 
the Zions First National Bank, at which time, in the presence 
of an officer of Zions First National Bank, the boat was de-
livered to Adams and Adams delivered a check to Deseret 
Manufacturing in the sum of $2,100.00. (Adams Deposition Pg.15) 
At no time did Nuffer or Tapp tell Adams that the First 
State Bank had a Security Agreement or Financing Statement 
filed on the boat which they were delivering to Adams, if in 
fact they thought they did. (Adams Deposition Pg. 19 lines 23-
25) 
Deseret Manufacturing demanded and received from Adams 
the additional sum of $6,500.00. Although Deseret Manufactur-
ing obtained from Adams the sum of approximately $8,600.00 in 
cash, Deseret Manufacturing did not repay the loan at First 
State Bank but used the funds for other purposes. The loan 
was due on August 15, 1976, but was not paid. (Kunz Deposition 
Pg. 6) 
Several weeks after the boat had been delivered to Adams, 
Nuffer and Tapp, called Kunz at the First State Bank and ad-
vised him that they knew where they could obtain possession of 
one of the boats listed on the Financing Statement and Security 
Agreement. They asked whether or not First State Bank would 
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like to have them repossess the boat or take possession of 
the boat and deliver it to the First State Bank. (Nuffer 
Deposition Pgs. 32-35; Tapp Deposition Pgs. 18-2 0) Mr. 
Kunz stated that he desired to discuss the matter with his 
attorneys and then would contact them and let them know if it 
would be alright. After a few hours, Mr. Kunz advised Nuffer 
and Tapp that he had discussed the matter with Mr. chamberlain 
and it was alright for them to take the boat from Adams and 
return it to the First State Bank. (Kunz Deposition Pgs. 7-10) 
Nuffer and Tapp went to the residence of Adams and with-
out warning or notice, took the boat out of the Adams' back-
yard and delivered it to the First State Bank. (Nuffer Deposi-
tion pgs. 32-35) (Tapp Deposition Pgs. 18-20) 
When the boat was delivered to the bank, Kunz examined the 
boat and discovered that the serial number on the boat did 
not match the serial number on the financing statement and the 
motor number did not correlate with boat serial number as 
shown on the Financing Statement. (Kunz Deposition Pgs. 9-10) 
Adams was unaware of the conduct of Nuffer, Tapp and Kunz 
and believed that his boat had been stolen and reported it to 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff. After the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff checked the matter, he discovered that the boat had * 
been taken by Nuffer and Tapp. Subsequent to his discovery, 
demand was made for the returni of the boat and the demand was 
refused and the plaintiff brought legal action for the restora-
tion of his boat and all the personal property which was in his 
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boat which, without dispute, belonged to Adams and over which 
no other party had right, title or authority. 
Neither Nuffer nor Tapp make any claim to any right of 
possession of the boat. 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IS NOT ACCURATE 
Rule 75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires the respondent to specify the statement of facts con-
tained in Appellant's Brief with which respondent disagrees. 
Respondent takes issue with at least the following statements 
of fact contained in Appellant's Brief and for the following 
reasonss 
I ••..' 
"However, the Financing Statement described the engine 
number of the boat with precise accuracy, viz: WLD-
VS-LI6-11821 (R.40; R.104)." Appellant's Brief Pg. 2. 
R.40 and 104 do not support appellant's statement. The 
statement is misleading. The testimony of Kunz, an officer 
of the bank, shows the following: 
"Q Did you crawl inside to determine whether the serial 
number on the motor was the same as it was shown to 
be with that same boat on your financing statement? 
A I think Mr. Nuffer read it to me as I remember it off 
from my financing statement. 
Q And I assume you discovered from that, the engine in 
that particular boat is not the engine shown on the 
financing statement? 
A This is correct." (Kunz Deposition Pg. 10, lines 2-10) 
(Emphasis added) 
II 
"Deseret became substantially indebted to Adams, doing 
business as FASCO, and attempted to pay him with checks 
that did not clear the bank (R.3)." Appellant's Brief, 
Pg. 3. 
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This statement is misleading. Adams testified that he 
did not allow balances to accumulate. The indebtedness 
occurred as a result of the fact that several checks were 
delivered to Adams at various times for the purchase of mat-
erials and were returned by the Bank unpaid all at once. 
(Adams Deposition pgs. 6 & 7) The statement of appellant in-
fers the checks were delivered to pay an outstanding account 
balance. 
> III 
"Some time after August 8, 1974, and considerably after 
the bank had filed its Financing Statement, Deseret 
issued an invoice to "FASCO" for the boat in question 
as well as other boats (R.103)." Appellant's Brief, Pg.3 
R.103, does not support appellant's statement. R.102, is 
a copy of the financing statement which shows on its face that 
it was not recorded until 8/5/74, just four days before the 
date of the invoice 8/8/74 (R.103.) 
IV 
"The deposition of Adams was taken and he could not 
produce any invoice for the boat in question but did 
exhibit the one appearing at R.103 saying that the 
invoice on the boat in question was "like this"... 
Deposition of Fred Adams, p. 18)". Appellant's Brief 
Pg. 3. 
This statement is inaccurate. Page 18 of Adams Deposition 
does not support this statement. A review of the Adam's De-
position shows that he was never asked to produce an "invoice" 
for his boat. During the Deposition, he was shown an "invoice" 
on another boat which was delivered to him on a later date. 
He was asked to identify the "invoice" and state what date that 
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invoice was delivered to him. 
V 
"The invoice at R.103 clearly indicates that the con-
sideration which Adams or "PASCO" paid was an antecedent 
indebtedness but that is not an issue before this Court." 
Appellant's Brife, Pg. 4. 
There is nothing on the face of R.103, which establishes 
that the consideration was an antecedent debt. Furthermore 
R.103, is an invoice for a boat other than the one involved 
in this dispute. R.104, designates the Adams boat as "... 
82M74L". The invoice at R.103, is for an "...85M75L" boat. 
VI 
"The boat was received by Adams long after the Financing 
Statement was filed (Adams Deposition p. 18)." 
(Emphasis added) 
Adams received his boat 9 days after the Financing State-
ment was filed. The Financing Statement was filed on August 5, 
1974 (R.102). Adams took possession of the boat and paid 
$2,100.00 additional cash on August 14, 1974. (Adams De-
position, pg. 18) 
VII 
"There is one important direct conflict in the evidence 
and therefore an issue of fact precluding summary judg-
ment for Adams, as two witnesses whose depositions were 
published and reviewed by the Trial Court in the Summary 
judgment proceeding testified that both of the witnesses 
advised Adams that First State Bank had a lien on the 
boat. (Deposition of Lynn Nuffer, P. 14, lines 6 & 7; 
P. 70, lines 20-25: Deposition of Steven Tapp, P. 11, 
lines 8-10)." Appellant's Brief Pgs. 4-5. 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary judgment and its 
Motion was heard on the same day as respondent's Motion for 
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Summary judgment. At the trial court level, appellant quite 
obviously did not argue to the court that a dispute in fact 
precluded a Summary judgment from being awarded to either 
party. 
The minute entry of the court (R.90), demonstrates that 
the court took both Motions under advisement at the same time. 
The appellant cites portions of the Depositions of Nuffer 
and Tapp to establish an alleged "issue" of fact. Appellant 
has not made this a point of argument. Respondent, there-
fore, will point out to the court that the portions cited will 
not support appellant's contention. 
The Deposition of Nuffer (pg. 14) does not say "he" told 
Adams, it says* "we told..." Such a statement is not admis-
sible in evidence. On the same page of the Deposition, (pg.14) 
Nuffer contradicted himself and mistakenly referred to the 
"DeNiro" note for $2,500.00 as the one at the First State Bank; 
thereby demonstrating that Nuffer and Tapp had mistakenly 
thought the DeNiro note was at the First State Bank. At page 
70 in Nuffer's Deposition, he admitted there was no agreement 
with Adams to use the payment of $2,000.00 to satisfy the First 
State Bank. At page 86, Nuffer admitted that the $2,500.00 
"DeNiro Note" was paid the same day he delivered the boat to 
Adams, apparently with the money received from Adams. 
in Nuffer's Deposition, he gave several different versions 
of the same alleged conversation with Adams. Nuffer testified 
"we" told Adams we needed the money: 
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1. "To pay the bank before we could give him his boat." 
(Pg. 70) Previously Nuffer admitted there was no 
agreement with Adams to pay the money received to 
the First State Bank. (Pg. 70) 
2. Had to have the money "That day to keep my men 
working" to pay the payroll. (Pg. 70) 
3. Had to pay the "DeNiro" note at the bank in the sum 
of $2,500.00. (pgs. 14-15) (Pg. 18) 
4. To pay our taxes. (Pgs. 14-15) 
5. Did not need the money for payroll — needed it to 
pay the bank. (Pgs. 43-44) Took the money and paid 
the payroll. (Pgs. 43-44) We paid our men with the 
money. (pg. 44) 
6. No agreement that we would use the money to pay the 
First State Bank. (pg. 70) We had decided to use 
the $6,500.00 which we received later from Adams to 
pay the First State Bank. (Pg. 70, 72 & 73) 
7. Used the money obtained from Adams to pay our payroll. 
(Pgs. 43-44) To make a payment on our building. (pg. 
70) To pay the DeNiro Note at the bank. (Pgs. 85-86) 
To pay our taxes. (Pgs. 14-15). Did not use the money 
to pay the First State Bank. (Pg. 37 lines 23-25) 
At page 2 0, line 22, the question was asked and the answer 
given as follows: 
"Q Now, see, I'm getting lost here. Are these conversations 
with somebody or is this just your own impression of 
what you thought you wanted to do? 
A This is what we wanted to get the money for..." 
The last answer made it clear Nuffer and Tapp were merely 
relating what they "wanted" not what was said in conversation. 
The Tapp Deposition disclosed that Tapp was only involved 
in the first conversation between Nuffer, Tapp and Adams. 
(Tapp Deposition Pg. 9, line 23; Pg. 12, line 25; and pg. 13, 
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l ines 1-4) Most of the Tapp testimony w:\r~ 'V- Lulu n:o 
Tapp Ires! i f:i ed ruihr after Nuflo. n. -. L.- i.bMinony was the 
same type of testimony, to-w.it- deeded mom/> icr Mlo. rhc-« 1 ", 
"taxes1", "payroll", "Bank", Federals or 1 >i ] ] s" (Tapp nep-
i » b i t - J O t l 1 i , I I I 
It would have been obvious to the Trial judge that neither 
Nuffer r»p f n'Jd Adams about: a so'oui* ] Ly interest at the 
*irst State Bank, Adams would not have agreed to pay $8,600.00 
- cash to acquire a boat with a "lion11 on it rand with no agree-
ment ' ••• l Nu I for oi Tapp to discharge the lien with the money 
receiver. • • , .•.,-.• 
i 
I <. i.so appears as though Nuffer: and Tapp wero personal ly 
obligated to pay the note at the First State Bank. (See the 
Security Agreement attached to the Deposition of Lynn Nuffer.) 
V1 11 ' ' 
"When the Bank confronted officers of Deseret about the 
wrongful disposal of the Bank's security, Deseret*s 
Principal officers and stockholders, Lynn Nuffer and 
Steven Tapp called First State Bank and asked if they 
should pick up one boat and return it to their place of 
business. They were instructed by the Bank to return the 
Bank's security (Deposition of Steven Tapp, P. 18, 19; 
Deposition of Lynn Nuffer, P. 33-35). The boat was pick-
ed up by Nuffer and Tapp and not by the Bank. (Deposition 
of Lynn Nuffer, p, 34 and 35)." Appellant's Brief pg. 5 
There is nothing in the record to support Lhis .statement. 
' - Depositions of Nuffer (Pgs. 32-35), Tapp (Pgs, 18-20) and 
Xunz (pgs, 7-10), make it clear that Nuffer and Tapp initiated 
tl ie "repossession1 of the Adams boat, but only after the Bank 
advised them to do so and told them they would not be held 
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liable for their actions. Nuffer and Tapp took the boat 
directly to the Bank. 
Nuffer testified that the bank expected Deseret Manufactur-
ing to dispose of the boats and to pay the bank with the money 
received (Nuffer Deposition Pg. 38 lines 19-25 and pg. 39 
lines 1-4) 
IX 
"(It should be noted parenthetically here that a secured 
party has the statutory right to require the debtor to 
assemble the collateral and make it available to the 
secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party (70A-9-503) after default.)" Appellant's Brief 
Pg. 5. 
Appellant fails to mention that Adams was not a debtor of 
the First State Bank. 
X 
"First State Bank had taken judgment against Deseret 
Manufacturing (R.ll). Appellant's Brief pg. 5. 
Appellant is quoting from its own pleadings, and there 
is nothing in the file to substantiate the allegations as 
contained in the pleadings. Furthermore, the statement of 
Appellant infers that judgment was taken before possession 
of the boat was obtained. There is nothing in the record to 
support that inference. 
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ARGUMENT 
" '
 :
 ' ' "' "" ' POINT I 
T H E F I R S T S T A T E B A N K FAILED TO FILE A FINANCING 
STATEMENT CONTAINING THE SERIAL NUMBER OF THE ADAMS 
BOAT AND THEREFORE HAS NO VALID SECURITY INTEREST 
IN THE BOAT SUPERIOR JV ADAMS. 
The ."rumit:c entry o4' the Trial Court (kJO> cciita.^ xo the 
following Janauacr-'-
"1. That because the financial (sic) statement filed by 
the bank contained the description of three boats of 
like description and serial numbers that varied from 
each other by only one digit, the claimed, erroneous 
serial number of plaintiff's boat included on that 
statement was a fatal defect sufficient to defeat the 
bank's security interest therein." (emphasis added) 
It should first be noted that 1 ho , * , 
evidence to establish that First State rsank .ntende.. o ^i<e 
a security interest in the Adams boat,, * .-*r > •;-.% ' mother 
boat with the serial number shown on 1: h - i-u-j. » i_,tement. 
The Deposition of Kunz (Kunz Deposit: ioi\ pg. ' w^s 
that he did not inspect the "boat or check the serial nunibexs, 
"The1 Adams boat was at, least partially completed when 
Kunz took the serial numbers. Adams had paid $3,568,27 as a 
cash down payment on the boai; two months 'before the bank li Led 
Its financing statement, (See Exhibit: attached to Tapp Deposi-
tion) The boat was being manufactured pursuant to the instruc-
tion of Adams as set forth on the ilea lei; Order Form, (see 
Exhibit, attached to Tapp Deposition) 
The Financing Statement filed by the bank" contained a List 
of 3 identically <;h i-vrji'i".| boats. The only difference in the 
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description of the boats was the serial number. It was 
impossible to differentiate between the three boats except 
by reference to the serial numbers. The serial numbers 
themselves differed by only one digit as follows: 
#DMFA0085M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 255 Waukesha Motor # WLDVSLI6-11821 
#DMFA0082M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 2 55 Waukesha Motor # WLDVSLI6-11824 
#DMFA0080M75l, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with 
engine 255 Waukesha Motor # WLDVSLI6 
There may be another 10 or 15, or more, boats manufactured 
by Deseret Manufacturing which would fit the above listed des-
criptions identically, except for a difference of one or two 
digits in the serial numbers. 
No one examining the Financing Statement filed by the 
bank would be aware that the Adams boat was allegedly covered 
by that statement. To make matters worse, the serial number 
of the motor shown after the serial number of the boat which 
the bank claims is the Adams boat, is not the serial number 
of the motor in the Adams boat. 
The Utah Code Annotated, (1953) Section 70 A-9-110, re-
quires that the description reasonably identify what is 
described. 
Under rules established prior to the Uniform commercial 
Code in many jurisdictions, it was necessary to list the 
serial number of an asset in order to create a valid lien 
against that object. 
-18-
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in I. ho 1962 o f f i c i a l Text of t h e Uniform c:x>ranic,\roial 
Code under the "comment" section following Sec. 9-110, the 
following statement is made: 
"The requirement of description of collateral... is 
evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a description 
* ' laid down by this Section is that the description do 
the job assigned to i t — t h a t it make possible the 
identification of the thing described. Under this rule 
Courts should refuse to follow the holdings, often 
found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that d e-
scriptions are insufficient unless they are of the most 
exact and detailed nature, the so-cal] ed "serial number" 
test, ,f • , • 
While it is true that; the purpose of Miction 9-110 was 
i'» f'uLjM -I rigid L'uIo# it is also true that section 9-1.10 
requires a description which makes it possible to identify 
the thing deseri bed • " •. . r • .• • • • : •• 
Where a Financing Statement is filed wh;ch differentiates 
between objects or things only by serial nuri 
JOOU i V" " F i IK» \enaJ number is aiJ you c.rt r^~y UIK > ;. * lr<-
scribe P.J object, Wheu the serial number:- ': i u.ror • don* •-ral 
n b j e c ^ *— \; by np|v one Jiqil , f hpn II 
heroines essential to moot I ho i equirt;ine:u. o •. i the • n* tor.^ 
Commercial code Section 9-1L0, as found in the Utah code 
Annotated (1953) s^ol ion ' ()A-1»- 1 10. .. • ••'• 
Tn the case of Yancey Brothers Co. v. nehco, inc., 108 
Ga. App. 87 5, 134 n A<\
 t 2d 8?fi (19641, 1 court rovi^wod section 
0-.M0 of the iniiluiiu ("oimiie r r i a J (ode, ^e C^urt. stated the 
following: 
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"Merely stating an incorrect serial number will not 
vitiate the contract if the key is there,... but, 
when the incorrect serial number is eliminated here, 
all that remains is the names of the parties..., the 
date, and the fact that a No. 60 caterpillar scraper 
was one of the subjects of the instrument. Under the 
cases cited above, this would not be sufficient to 
create a jury question as to constructive notice." 
The court held the filing of the security interest was 
invalid because of a faulty serial number description. 
The appellant has cited several cases in its Brief which 
it alleges are similar to the facts of the instant case. A 
careful reading of the cases cited by appellant establish 
that the facts in those cases are quite different from the 
instant case and the holdings in those cases do not really 
conflict with the holding in the Yancey case. 
Appellant cites Still Associates v. Murphy, 267 N.E. 2d 
217 (Mass. 1971). in the Still case a used truck was sold by 
a Lavoie to a Murphy without disclosing the "lien11 of Still 
Associates, inc. Lavoie was not in the business of manufactur-
ing trucks, had not manufactured this truck and the security 
instrument did not list 3 trucks of identical description with 
only serial numbers to differentiate the trucks and with 3 
practically identical serial numbers. The instrument filed 
apparently was the only instrument and described only the one 
truck as a "1967 Dodge 6 Cyl. D-100 pickup serial # 1161-
702080." inasmuch as there was only one truck described on the 
instrument the court held a one-digit error would not be fatal. 
It is also interesting to note that the model year of the truck 
was also listed on the instrument. 
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The court supported i ts deci si oi 1 :i i 1 1I 1 e Sti 11 case by 
citing I:t le case of National Cash Register Co. ^ ;r. Firestone 
& Co. , lnc_., 346 Mass 255 (1 IJCC Rep 460, 4 6 5 ) , whi ch cc ni-
si t r u e d s e c t i o i I 9 •- 4 0 2 (5 ) w h :i • :: h p r o v i d e d i!' (a ) f i i I a i I c :i :t I g s t a t e -
merit substantially complying wi th the requirement of this 
sect ion i s effect ive even t hough it con ta ins in i nor errors 
wi: ii ch are not seriously misleading. " (Emphasis added.) 
The Still case does not apply to the Instant case because 
o f t h e va s t f a c 11 :t a I d. :i f f e r €^  n c e a n d b e c a u s e t h e e r i: o i :i i l t h e 
i ; a^io: j -,4. -tern* n' I in-* S t i l l c a s e w a s '-. **- ~e^i _y * ~-
l e a d i n c " 
/\p • • v , '. , , * s * i -: n a s e 
"°'
,c
 N a t i o n a l Ca_sh_ R e g i s t e r Co* v . ' i f s t o n * A p p o l i ^ t B r i e f 
'
1 l C /
- ' "O] » K ! •.* c i t e s t i i e ^ n , • ~t *lllJ-JL ^Ib i : r b - ^u_. 
D.hi.H . S i e r r a , i n c . " 
i n t h e c a s e o f N a t . B ._&_T. C £ . o f E n i d v . Communi ty fi. G. T . 
C o . , 52B p2d 710 ink I , I »7.| " f - d 1-w i p p o l h m t i " W '''PT-'I 
l/l'J), S e r i a l No . 2G68S176'50.3" ivas t h e s u b j e c t o f a f i n a n c i n g 
s t a t e m e n t p r i o r i t y f i l i n g d i s p u t e , The s e r i a l number w a s i n 
<nrior by one d i g i l Th< VMSC i h . l m 1 i n v o l - ' u a i n a n u l , i c t u r o r 
o f e a r s w i t h a f i n a n c i n g s t a t e m e n t c o n t a i n i n g 3 c a r s of i d e n -
t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n d i f f e r i n g o n l y b y s e r i a l n u m b e r s w h i c h 
\/ai' J ed by i »n 1 y < uie d i q j t . . 
B e c a u s e o n l y o n e c a r war i u t ' A l . . . "c. s t a t e m e n t J::CI b e -
c a u s e n e i t h e r p a r t y e v e n d:i s c *;• • - :-v• r~-
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ed by the trial judge), it was stated by the court that the 
one digit error - alone would not be fatal. 
The Court did hold, however, that the original party 
filing the financing statement did not have priority because 
of its failure to examine the manufacturer's statement of 
origin and thereby assure itself that the title to the car 
would be issued in the name of "Lee Anderson". Because the 
financing statement was filed under the name of "James L. 
Anderson" instead of "Lee Anderson" the filing was insufficient. 
The court then reiterated the following rule as set forth: 
"in Bankers investment Co. v. Humphrey, Okl., 369 P.2d 608: 
"*** Where one of two innocent parties must suffer through 
the act or negligence of a third party, the loss should 
fall upon the one who by his conduct created the circum-
stances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the 
wrong or cause the loss."" 
The court then said: 
"The quoted rule from Bankers, also called the doctrine of 
estoppel by negligence and the "two innocent persons" 
principle, is admittedly of equitable origin. Sec. 28 
Am. jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 62 and 27 Am. jur. 
2d Equity, § 147. Under 12A O.S. 197, § 1-103, "*** 
the principles of *** equity, including ***. estoppel 
*** shall supplement ***" the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code unless displaced by particular provisions 
of that Code. 
We hold that the quoted rule from Bankers was properly 
applied in this case." 
The appellant's Brief alludes to a Girard case. That 
case, Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, 
inc., 13 pa. D&C 2d 119 merely holds that the Uniform commercial 
Code Section 9-110 removed the necessity of a serial number 
-22-
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from the fi I ing :i :eqi :ij rements. 
It is therefore clear that there is 01 lly one case cited 
by appellant wlii ci i :i s approximately similar to the facts in 
the :i nstai it case. That case, the Yancey case, invol ved two 
Caterpillar Scrapers, a I D and a 2w Scraper, The B:i 1J of 
Sale incorrect] y do si g rut <>d the v W Scraper al t! ioi lgi i :i I: i; i ., = 
the ] D which was actually delivered. The decis3 on of the 
Yancey case supports the position oi respondent and the de-
ci ci 01 1 rendered by I 1K> I tin I tjouil,, •- ,,^ r ''" 
The other cases cited by appellant involve fact situa-
tions which are not similar and their holdings do mil roul 
'n'illii I1 uh> iii L he Yancey case, 
rt is also clear that the First Stste 3ank ritn->- -?: not 
intend tc fake a "ecut'if. interest 1 > I "i ul.aiu, Lt»af 1 1 " 
negligently fulled to inspect the boats and/or copy the serial 
numbers of the boats and motors correctly, 
Thr* ban I h.ivin 1 tajJiMi in MI 1 1 I \u. 1 equi rement *> ut" Section 
70 T^-y-lUi, Mtah code Annotated (1953) and having negligently • 
-it best f-ailpd to file a fxnancutq sKitoment i «uiit a 1 n 1 n.) t hi e 
rorrort »<«riaj numbers ol the boat and niotoi does not have a 
veil 2 a security interest as against: Adams, 
The L n a i c:",r' • ••• - !di «•-•. ^ . 
"because the financial (sic) statement filed by the bank 
contained the description of three boats of like descrip-
tion and serial numbers that varied from each other by 
only one digit, the claimed erroneous serial number of 
plaintiff's boat included on that statement was a fatal 
defect sufficient to defeat the bank's security interest 
there in." (R90) (Empha si s Added) 
-2 3-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant cannot establish that the First State Bank 
intended to take a "lien1 on the Adams boat. At best, all 
that can be said is it negligently failed to adequately 
describe the Adams boat. There may be another ten to twenty 
boats which the First State Bank could claim fit the descrip-
tion contained in the financing statement except for a one or 
two digit difference in the serial number. 
The description was not sufficient as required by the 
Utah code Annotated to create a valid security interest in 
the First State Bank, 
The only case cited by appellant with facts similar to 
the instant case is the Yanoey case and it supports the position 
of respondent. 
Respondent therefore respectfully requests this Court 
to sustain the decision of the Trial court judge and affirm 
the partial Summary judgment awarded to plaintiff-Respondent 
Adams. 
Respectfully submitted, 
jack L. Schoenhals 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
-24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 27th day of February, 1976, 
T mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Rriof" of R^spondei it 
h.i Mi K'/n chamberlain, 0..sen & Chamberlain, 76 South Mai i 1 
Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
jack I,. Schoenha 1 s 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
